Sunday, May 4, 2025

Justice Nani Tagia to hear Urmila Kumari's case against withholding of pension because of post retirement inquiry since early 2019

Urmila Kumari, a 66 year old retired teacher is waiting for her pension since January 2019. Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 3871/2022 was filed on March 3, 2022 on behalf of Urmila Kumari. It was registered on March 8, 2022. The writ was filed against the State of Bihar, the Principal Secretary, Education Department, Government of Bihar, Patna, the Regional Education Department Director, Patna Division, Patna, the Regional Education Deputy Director, Patna Division, Patna and the District Programme Officer (Establishment), Patna-cum-Inquiry Officer, Patna for the purpose of admission. The case is listed for admission at Cause List Serial No.: 20 before Court No. 18 of Justice Nani Tagia on May 5, 2025. It was taken up by him April 28, 2025 but the Court passed an order in by Urmila Kumari vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. saying, "On the prayer of learned counsel for the petitioner, list this case on 05.05.2025." It was adjouned on April 28, 2025. Between April 2022-April 2025, so far the High Court has given seven routine orders in this case. 

Notably, Urmila Kumari used to get pension during August 2018-December 2018 but the same has been withheld because 29 years after serving as assistant teacher departmental inquiry was initiated post her retirement on January 5, 2019 disregarding Supreme Court's decision in State of Bihar v. Md. Idris Ansari 1995 Supp 3 SCC 6 which is binding. It held that such departmental proceedings shall have to be in respect of misconduct which took place not more than four years before the initiation of such proceedings. In the case Urmila Kumari neither the limitation period of four years have been adhered to nor has any misconduct been alleged. The State Government flouted all principles of fairness in undertaking departmental inquiry and also violated the specific rules of procedure.   

Also read: Patna High Court Chief Justice led Bench imposes costs on Bihar State

Division Bench led by 44th Chief Justice set aside judgement of Single Judge Bench of Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad 

Post retirement pensions cannot be withheld because of pending enquiry proceedings 

 




 

 

Friday, May 2, 2025

Supreme Court dismisses husband's special leave petition, orders transfer of fixed deposit of Rs.1,00,000/ with interest to account of wife

In Ram Kishore Singh @Ram Kishore vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Aravind Kumar passed an order on April 30, 2025. It reads:"In the instant special leave petition, notice was issued on 02.04.2024 only with respect to mediation subject to payment of cost of Rs.1,00,000/- which is lying with the Registry of this Court in Fixed Deposit. 2) Later, the matter was referred to mediation on 24.01.2025. As per the report received from the Supreme Court Mediation Centre, the mediation remained unsuccessful. 3) After hearing learned counsel for the parties and due to the fact that limited notice was issued for mediation which remained unsuccessful, we are not inclined to entertain the present special leave petition. Accordingly, the special leave petition is dismissed. ....4) On supplying the account details of the complainant-respondent No.2 within three days to the Registry, the amount lying in the fixed deposit along with interest, if any, shall be transmitted in her account". The order was passed after the receipt of the mediation report. The respondent no. 2 is Raushani Kumari, a resident of Chandmari, Motihari and the wife of the petitioner.

This case arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated February 13, 2024 passed by Justice Patna High Court which had arisen out of police case in 2022 in Mahila Thana, East Champaran. The application before the High Court was filed under section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing order dated July 19, 2022 passed by SDJM, Sadar Motihari, East Champaran whereby he had taken cognizance under sections 498(A), 504, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner in connection with Mahila P.S. Case pending in the Court of S.D.J.M., Sadar Motihari, East Champaran.

The prosecution case, was that the wife of the petitioner had filed the case, alleging that on November 30, 2013, her marriage was solemnized with the petitioner, and her father gave her ornaments worth Rs. 2,50,000/-, clothes and furniture, and cash of Rs. 10–12 lakh. After marriage, she had gone to her matrimonial house, and after 4-5 days of hearing about the cheating of her husband on another girl, at the instigation of her in-laws, her husband started demanding a four-wheeler. On this issue, her husband (the petitioner), Harikant Singh (the father-in-law), Kunti Devi, Shyam Kishore Singh (Devar), and Kanhaiya Kishore Singh (Devar) started torturing her; for that, they abused her and threatened to kill her. Her husband tried to kill her with his licensed revolver. After acknowledging the same, her parents tried to pacify the matter. In the meantime, from wedlock, six-year-old Om Kumar (son) and a one-year-old daughter (Ananya) were born, but they did not stop torturing. In the year 2020, her husband went to Patna to leave her and their children. He did not want to talk and provide expenses. He always used to talk about another marriage. In 2021, he ousted her, taking all her belongings. After settlement, she went to Sasural at Muzaffarpur, but on January 12, 2022, they ousted her and always threatened to kill her and her family members. Her husband is a police personnel, and he was posted at the District Head Quarter Motihari, C.I.D. Department. The petitioner submitted that the petitioner is the husband of Opposite Party No. 2, and no such occurrence, as alleged in F.I.R., has ever taken place. The petitioner has never committed any torture or demanded any dowry from OP No. 2. It is next submitted that the marriage is about more than 11 years old, and out of wedlock, two children were born who are presently aged about 8 years and 2 and a half years. It is also asserted and submitted on behalf of the petitioner that he is not aggrieved by his wife but is aggrieved further submits that the petitioner has been implicated in more than three cases by the Opposite party No. 2. He submitted that the petitioner was ready and willing to keep Opposite Party No. 2, as his wife, with honour and dignity. The counsel of the Opposite party No. 2 submitted that there was specific allegation against this petitioner that he, along with other co-accused persons, not only assaulted the Opposite party No. 2 but also abused her on several occasions for non-fulfillment of the demand of dowry and lastly, in the year 2018 also, the petitioner demanded dowry, and on refusal, the petitioner threatened the opposite party No. 2 on the point of pistol. Therefore, it was prayed on
behalf of opposite party no. 2 that the petitioner should be put on trial. 

The High Court's Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh had concluded: "Considering the rival submissions of the parties and materials available on record, the Court is of the opinion that there is direct and specific allegation against this petitioner of committing torture, assault, and abuse to opposite party No. 2. As such, I do not find any illegality or irregularity in the order impugned which warrants any interference by this Court." The petition was dismissed. 

Thursday, May 1, 2025

Division Bench led by 44th Chief Justice set aside judgement of Single Judge Bench of Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad

In Kamini Kumari vs The State of Bihar & Ors (2024), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices K. Vinod Chandran, 44th Chief Justice and Harish Kumar concluded: "46.....we reverse the judgment of the learned Single Judge by allowing the appeals and allow the writ petitions setting aside the impugned orders. The orders set aside are those in which the punishments have been imposed, produced in the writ petition or by way of interlocutory application. These produced in the appeals, passed while they were pending also are set aside" in its 39-page long judgement. The judgement dated February 27, 2024 was authored by Chief Justice Vinod Chandran. 

The appeal was heard with Sauda Khatun vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., Smt. Tara Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., Smt. Meera Pathak vs.The State of Bihar & Ors., Smt. Rita Rani vs.The State of Bihar & Ors. and Bansuri Acharya vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. The Division Bench examined the "validity of an inquiry after retirement" on the basis of the binding precedents. 

The 87-page long judgement dated September 26, 2023 by Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad in Shamima Khatoon vs. The State of Bihar (2023) through the Principal Secretary, Human Resource Department, Patna & Ors. was set aside. Kamini Kumari was one of 46 petitioners in the case.

The judgement of the Division Bench reads: "47. The petitioners/appellants would be deemed to have retired from service and their pension would be restored with immediate effect. The petitioners shall be paid pension from March-2024 and the arrears for the period when they were denied of such pension, by reason of the impugned orders in the writ petition, shall be paid within a period of four months from today. The State shall be mulcted with further liability of interest at the rate of 5 per cent i.e from the date of stoppage of pension, if the arrears are not paid within four months. If interest is attracted by reason only of the delay caused in disbursing the arrears, then the State would be entirely at liberty to proceed against those officers who are responsible for the delay and recover the interest portion from them."

The Division Bench observed: "48. We cannot but express our anguish, in the manner in which the inquiry proceedings were initiated and proceeded arbitrarily, flouting all procedural requirements. There were even instances of the disciplinary authority finding the individual liable to be continued, after which, again without notice subsequent inquiry report was obtained and punishment imposed. The State, being a welfare state has an obligation to its employees. The persons appointed were appointed decades back and continued in the employment of the State. Even if the CBI found some irregularities, it was for the State to meticulously examine whether such irregularities existed and if it did, whether it was expedient to take action against the petitioners, especially considering the passage of time and the fact that the State had extracted work from such persons in the intervening years. There is also no complaint raised against the appellants who were teachers, teaching in various schools. There is not even one instance pointed out when their services were found to be unsatisfactory. None of them are accused of any misconduct, four years prior to their retirement, or at any time before, in their total service. The State having acted in such an arbitrary manner; put the petitioners, unnecessary agony, dispair and prejudice by denying the entire pension for long years; which is held to be a matter of right and not a bounty paid by the State. On the above reasoning, we are of the opinion that the State should be imposed with costs which is quantified at Rs. 5,000/- in each of the appeals, which shall be paid along with the arrears." 

The appeals arose from the common judgment of Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, a Single Judge in analogous writ petitions. The petitioners were teachers appointed in the early 1980s whose appointments were subject of an inquiry, conducted by the CBI, on directions of this Court in a Public Interest Litigation (PIL). A report was submitted by the CBI and no action was taken. Again, a PIL was filed which led to further action against the teachers who were alleged to have been appointed illegally; in the CBI report. The various punishments imposed were set aside, in some of the cases, finding the departmental inquiry initiated against each of them to be improper. By reason of the liberty left by the High Court to proceed afresh, the Department proceeded de novo against the said teachers. Many of them had retired, against whom, after inquiry, punishment was imposed withdrawing their pension in toto. Those who were in employment at the time of the de novo inquiry were terminated from service. Both these categories of persons along with others who were issued with show-cause notices approached this Court with a number of writ petitions, all of which were rejected by the judgment impugned in the appeals.

The Single Judge had categorized the writ petitions into three; (i) those whose pensions were withdrawn in entirety, having retired from service, (ii) those who were terminated from service and (iii) the teachers who were issued with show-cause notices. The common thread in the proceedings against all the petitioners, some of whom are the appellants before the Division Bench led by 44th Chief Justice, was the CBI inquiry. The impugned judgment which relied on the CBI inquiry report; which supported the allegations raised of illegal appointments, to find the penalty imposed to be perfectly in order, especially when the illegal appointments were held to have interfered with and violated the rule of equality, a fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The appointments were found to be made in collusion, based on extraneous considerations, without proper advertisements, non-compliance of roster points, no transparent selection process having been carried out; all very compelling factors vitiating the very appointments, was the finding. The appointments thus made, by reason of the fraud employed, make such appointments void ab initio according to the writ court.

The appellants' counsel submitted that the findings in the impugned judgment are erroneous, misdirected and fail to reckon the principles and procedures which validate a proper departmental inquiry. The mere reliance on the CBI report which was kept in the back-burner for a number of years and which did not lead to registration of any FIRs was completely wrong. The inquiry initiated, after retirement did not follow the rules of procedure and hence the very initiation was flawed. After retirement there is no employer employee relationship subsisting. There was absolutely no evidence led at the inquiry and even the report was not marked in the inquiry as a document. The CBI report having not been marked in the inquiry, the reliance placed by the Single Judge on the submissions made before Court on behalf of the CBI, by their Counsel was not in order. None of the legal contentions raised against the inquiry conducted and the punishment imposed were looked into by the Single Judge. The allegations in the inquiry report were demonstrated, by the documents on record, to be false. The appellants were entitled to seek for resumption of their pension with arrears paid and those who were terminated, to be reinstated with all attendant benefits.

In CWJC No. 9847 of 1998 Brajesh Kumar Singh and Others vs. State of Bihar and Others, by an order dated December 16, 2019, there was a direction to the CBI to carry out investigation in the matter of appointments/promotion Assistant Teachers in the Lower Subordinate Education Service (women wing) who were appointed between 1980 to 1988. The CBI submitted its report on November 9, 2004 before the Chief Secretary, State of Bihar. In the report, out of 305 teachers, only 27 were found to be regularly appointed. Recommendation was made for taking action against the illegally appointed teachers and also
against those officers who made such appointments. According to the CBI, the appointments were made without advertisements, without roster clearance and without following the reservation rules. There was also allegation of over age and lack of required mandatory qualification raised against certain individuals. The CBI did not register any FIR to put the criminal law into motion and the State slept over the matter.Notably, the State woke up to the alleged illegality said to have been committed by its own officers only in the year 2016 when CWJC No. 10022 of 2016 was filed. In the writ petition the Principal Secretary and the other officers of the Department of Education were called upon to appear in person to put forth, the action taken by the State on the report of the CBI. Based on the orders issued in the Public Interest Litigation, show-cause notices were issued and punishment imposed of termination, in some of the cases. 

Subsequently, a batch of writ petitions were filed and disposed of on January 17, 2017 in Shanti Kumari vs. State of Bihar & Ors., CWJC No. 17904 of 2016. The petitioners, some of whom are also the appellants in the appeals before the Division Bench led by 44th Chief Justice Vinod Chandran, were found to be deprived of a reasonable opportunity to canvas their respective cases, produce relevant documents together with supporting case laws. It was categorically stated that the observations against the inquiry would not be a shield against further proceedings when the appointments were said to have been plagued by fraud. The said liberty left to the department resulted in the present proceedings and the various penalties imposed.
      
The Division Bench relied on Supreme Court's decision in n State of Bihar v. Md. Idris Ansari 1995 Supp 3 SCC 6. The decision of the Court in para 7 reads: "7. A mere look at these provisions shows that before the power under Rule 43(b) can be exercised in connection with the alleged misconduct of a retired government servant, it must be shown that in departmental proceedings or judicial proceedings the government servant concerned is found guilty of grave misconduct. This is also subject to the rider that such departmental proceedings shall have to be in respect of misconduct which took place not more than four years before the initiation of such proceedings. It is, therefore, apparent that no departmental proceedings could have been initiated in 1993 against the respondent under Rule 43(a) and (b), in connection with the alleged misconduct, as it is alleged to have taken place in the year 1986-87. As the alleged misconduct by 1993 was at least six years' old, Rule 43(b) was out of picture."   

Rule 139 of the Bihar Pension Rules has also been interpreted in Md. Idris Ansari case in para 9 and 10 from. It reads: "9. So far as that rule is concerned, it empowers the State Authorities to decide the question whether full pension should be allowed to a retired circumstances contemplated by the rule. The first circumstance is that if the service of the government servant concerned is not found to be thoroughly satisfactory, appropriate reduction in the pension can be ordered by the sanctioning authority. The second circumstance is that if it is found that service of the pensioner was not thoroughly satisfactory or there is proof of grave misconduct on the part of the government servant concerned while in service, the State Government in exercise of revisional power may interfere with the fixation of pension by the subordinate authority. But such power flowing from Rule 139, under the aforesaid circumstances, is further hedged by two conditions. First condition is that revisional power has to be exercised in consonance with the principles of natural justice and secondly such revisional power can be exercised only within three years from the date of the sanctioning of the pension for the first time. A conjoint reading of Rule 43(b) and Rule 139 reveals that "So far as the second type of cases are concerned the proof of grave misconduct on the part of the government servant concerned during his service tenure will have to be culled out by the revisional authority from the departmental proceedings or judicial proceedings which might have taken place during his service tenure or from departmental proceedings which may be initiated even after his retirement in such type of cases. But such departmental proceedings will have to comply with the requirements of Rule 43(b). Consequently, a retired government servant can be found guilty of grave misconduct during his service career pursuant to the departmental proceedings conducted against him even after his retirement, but such proceedings could be initiated in connection with only such misconduct which might have taken place within 4 years of the initiation of such departmental proceedings against him...No question of remanding the proceedings under Rule 139(a) and (b) would survive as the alleged grave misconduct could not be established in any departmental proceedings after the expiry of four years from 1986-87, as such proceedings would be clearly barred by Rule 43(b) proviso (a)(ii). Consequently, the show-cause notice dated 27-9-1993 will have to be treated as stillborn and ineffective from its inception. Such a notice cannot be resorted to for supporting any fresh proceedings by way of remand. For all these reasons no case is made for our interference in this appeal. In the result appeal fails and is dismissed." 

The Division Bench observed: "41. We cannot but deprecate the manner in which the inquiry proceedings were initiated by the State Government. True there was a CBI inquiry initiated in the PIL, in the course
of which the petitioners were not at all examined or given an opportunity to put up their defence. The report of the CBI was filed in the year 2004 when all the petitioners were in service. Even then if a disciplinary proceeding had been taken, it would have been grossly delayed since the appointments were made in 1980’s." 

It referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court passed in Civil Appeal No. 1328 of 1995 Union of India vs. Kishori Lal Bablani reported in AIR 1999 SC 517 and P. V. Mahadevan Vs. M.D. Tamilnadu Housing Board reported in AIR 2006 SC 207

In Kishori Lal Bablani case, the ground raised by the appellants that in a writ petition filed in the year 1985, appointments made as far back as in the year 1974 ought not to have been disturbed was accepted. In the case of P. V. Mahadevan case there was delay of 12 years in initiating disciplinary proceedings, upon which the charge memo itself was set aside. Here, the appointments made in the CBI were continued for long and even after a CBI report was submitted to the Court; the further action took another 14 years, i.e. commenced in 2016. With respect to the appeals first considered, it was again much later. We also have to observe that in the inquiry conducted, no witnesses were examined. The CBI report relied on was also not marked and proved through an officer who conducted the investigation. 

The Division Bench observed: "We have found that the State Government had flouted all principles of fairness in disciplinary inquiry and also violated the specific rules of procedure as brought out under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. 43. Less said the better about the manner in which the inquiry was conducted. The memo of charges only contained the extract of the CBI report pointing out the alleged irregularity, as against the appointment of the individual petitioners. There was none examined at the inquiry nor documents marked. The extract of the CBI report could have been marked and proved only by the person who prepared the report or another officer of the CBI, who could depose on the basis of the records. This procedure was not followed and the inquiry officer did not independently consider the irregularity in appointment alleged.

It referred to Court's decision in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank reported in (2009) 2 SCC 270 on how a valid disciplinary inquiry, a quasi-judicial proceeding is to be conducted. It relevant part reads:"14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence."

Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad's judgement reads:" This Court is of the considered opinion that where the illegality writs large on the face of the kind of allegations made in the preliminary inquiry, the principle of natural justice cannot be stretched to the extent of rejecting the report of the CBI as a waste paper. It is to be remembered that the matter relating to illegal appointments of these petitioners were raised as back as in the year 1998 and the inquiry report of the CBI was submitted in the year 2004 itself. But it was kept pending for no valid reason and had the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court not called upon the Principal Secretary of the Education Department, Government of Bihar to explain as to why no action has been taken on the inquiry report of the CBI, the matter would have remained as it is."

As Single Judge Bench he had observed: "The huge delay on the part of the State respondents by sitting over the preliminary inquiry report of the CBI has done a lot of damage to the interest of the State. The delay alone has given rise to a spacious plea that at this stage the petitioners have continued over 30 years, therefore, no action may be taken against them in accordance with law. Although this Court has negated this plea but at the same time it is noticed that by virtue of the appointments which were wholly illegal, public money has been disbursed to the illegal appointees conferring them the benefits of pay and perks during all these years. This Court being a constitutional Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India deems it just and proper to take judicial notice of the principles of public accountability. The case of Vineet Narain and Ors. Vs. the Union of India and Ors. reported in (1996) 2 SCC 199, is a step forward towards accountability in public life. The preliminary investigation report of the CBI is clearly indicating towards extraneous consideration which has taken place in the matter of large scale appointments and promotions in the LSS (Women wing) in the State of Bihar during the period 1980-1998. The case was handed over to CBI but why CBI remained contented by only submitting a preliminary inquiry report is something which is required to be looked into by the CBI itself at this stage. This Court is concerned because it is of the opinion that those who were involved in keeping aside the law and the procedures for appointment on public post should not be allowed to go scot-free only because they have succeeded in somehow stalling the consequential action. In the totality of the circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion as under:-
(i) The CBI should take the case to a logical end. Its preliminary inquiry report is available on the record indicating the manner in which appointments were done on political recommendations and by the authorities in the Education Department who were not competent, without advertisement and without there being any selection process. The CBI is, therefore, obliged to consider as to whether or not its’ preliminary report should be converted in a regular  case and the matter be investigated in accordance with law for its logical conclusion; and
(ii) The Additional Chief Secretary of the Education Department, Government of Bihar is also required to look into the reason(s) for the huge delay in not taking the consequential action pursuant to the report of the CBI submitted in the year 2004. Those who are behind this inaction are required to be identified and appropriate action is to be considered." 

The Single Judge had further observed: "Accordingly, this Court having taken judicial notice of the above mentioned facts emerging from the pleadings on the record and finding that the CBI is already party respondent in some of the writ applications, directs the Director, CBI and the Additional Chief Secretary, Department of Education, Government of Bihar to consider taking appropriate action within a period of one month from the date of receipt/communication of this order."

This judgement of the Single Judge Bench has been set aside by the Chief Justice led Division Bench which rigorously examined the "validity of an inquiry after retirement" on the basis of the binding precedents which were ignored. 

Also read: Post retirement pensions cannot be withheld because of pending enquiry proceedings 

 Patna High Court Chief Justice led Bench imposes costs on Bihar State



 

Supreme Court's Division Bench seeks ballistic report of the pistol in a challenge against order of Justice Harish Kumar

In Vjay Prasad Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench  of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Manoj Misra passed an order which deemed it "appropriate to direct the learned counsel for the State to bring on record the ballistic report with regard to the pistol said to have been recovered from Sudama Sahani @ Sudama Sahni, as also the details with regard to the SIM Card being used at the relevant time/CDR, if the same has been recovered relating to Ramesh Mahto." The matter is to be listed on July 30, 2025. 

Patna High Court's Justice Harish Kumar had heard the case which arose Motihari, East Champaran. The petitions of Ramesh Mahto and Sudama Sahani were heard together and the order was passed on November  20, 2024. The application for grant of bail to the petitioners who are in custody in connection with Motihari Town Case registered for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 120B, 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959.

The prosecution alleged that on June 26, 2024 while the informant and his elder brother, Suresh Prasad Yadav, went on his four wheeler and reached near a railway crossing, in the mean time, two unknown miscreants who were standing there, opened fire, due to which the informant’s brother sustained gun shot injury. After causing fire arm injury, both the miscreants sat on one Apache motorcycle alongwith one pillion rider and fled away. The fire arm injuries sustained to the deceased proved fatal.The petitioners' counsel contended that the FIR was instituted against unknown miscreants, however, during the course of investigation the name of the petitioners sprung up on the confessional statement of co-accused persons; save and except the confessional statement, there is no other material suggesting the involvement of the petitioner in the crime. It was also contended that during the course of investigation various other co-accused persons have been apprehended, but they did not disclose the name of the petitioners in causing the murder of the deceased. So far the petitioner in Cr. Misc. No. 62213 of 2024 is concerned, the only material which has come during the course of investigation is that before the occurrence, the petitioner had conversation with one of the co-accused person, whose mobile was allegedly fallen at the place of occurrence in course of fleeing. So far the petitioner in Cr. Misc. No. 64450 of 2024 is concerned, during the course of investigation it has come that on the confessional statement of Harishankar Paswan, the weapon which is said to be used in the crime, has been recovered from the house of the petitioner. It is lastly contended that now the investigation of the crime is complete and the chargesheet has been submitted and, as such, there is no chance of tampering with the evidence or threatening the witnesses. The petitioners undertake that they will fully cooperate in the proceeding of the Court. 

Regard being had to the submissions made on behalf of the parties and considering the materials collected
during the course of investigation apart from the criminal antecedent of the petitioner, the Court is not acceded to the prayer of the petitioners for the present, however the Court directed that the petitioners shall be released from the custody after framing of the charge in the afore-noted case on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Motihari, East Champaran.

Supreme Court's Division Bench reverses decision of Justice Partha Sarthy which endorsed cognizance order of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Biharsharif (Nalanda)

In Parmanand Prasad vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran observed:"In any case considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of offences and the sequence therein, it appears to be a false case and we are of the opinion that in this case, the High Court ought to have invoked the power under Section 482 of the Code and should have against the petitioner. We do not think there is any justification here in this case for the petitioner to undergo trial." It allowed the prayer of the petitioner and quash the criminal proceedings. The 3-page long order was passed on April 29, 2025.  

The petitioner was an accused in a complaint case instituted at the instance of Rohit Raj, the respondent no.2-complainant pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Biharshariff, Nalanda, Bihar, or the offences punishable under 379, 504, 506, 120(B) read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) where the Court took cognizance under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of the IPC against the petitioner. His petition against this order, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was dismissed by Justice Partha Sarthy of the Patna High Court. Being aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court. The Court had stayed further proceedings in the complaint against the petitioner by its order dated November 11, 2024

Section 323 deals with voluntarily causing hurt. This section punishes anyone who intentionally causes harm to another person, excluding cases covered under Section 334. The punishment for this offense can be imprisonment for up to one year, a fine of up to 1,000 rupees, or both.

Section 504 deals with intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace. This section penalizes individuals who intentionally insult someone, thereby provoking them to commit a breach of the peace or other offenses. The punishment for this offense can be imprisonment for up to two years, a fine, or both.

Section 506 deals with criminal intimidation. This section addresses criminal intimidation, which includes making threats to cause death or grievous hurt, or to commit other serious offenses. The punishment for this offense can vary depending on the severity of the threat, ranging from up to two years of imprisonment and/or a fine for simple intimidation, to up to seven years of imprisonment, a fine, or both for more severe threats.

The complaint stated that the petitioner along with another person had attacked on the respondent no.2-the complainant. There are no injuries and the case inter-alia is registered under Section 307 of the IPC, which addresses the offense of attempt to murder.. The fact of the matter is that prior to one month from filing of the aforesaid complaint, the petitioner had lodged an FIR against the respondent no.2-the complainant along with another person for having attacked the petitioner who is a practicing lawyer in Patna. It is from the very same transaction, where the complainant had gone to the office of the petitioner with the another person that the complaint was raised after one month. 

In his 7-page long order dated July 11, 2024, Justice Partha Sarthy had concluded: "in the opinion of the Court, there is no illegality in the order impugned dated 5.7.2023 passed in Complaint Case no.135C of 2023 by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Biharsharif (Nalanda) taking cognizance under sections 323, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code".

He observed: "Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the material on record, this Court finds that in the complaint (Annexure-1) filed by the complainant, there is no direct allegation against the petitioner along with one another of having abused and assaulted the complainant and others. Though the petitioner has made substantial points of an earlier FIR having been lodged by him being Bihar P.S. Case no.28 of 2023 on 8.1.2023 with respect to the occurrence of the same date as in the present complaint, the Investigating Officer having found the contents of the said FIR to be true and having submitted chargesheet no.194 of 2023 on 28.2.2023 together with the delay in filing of the instant complaint, in the opinion of the Court, these points being the defence of the petitioner could not have been looked into by the learned trial Court at the time of taking cognizance. The Court was required only to see the contents of the complaint petition together with the statement of the complainant and the witnesses examined in support of the complaint during enquiry. The Court did not have the jurisdiction to examine the correctness of the allegations made in the complaint." He made reference to the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Pratibha Rani vs. Suraj Kumar & Anr.; (1985) 2 SCC 370 and M/s. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma P. Ltd. vs. M/s. Biological E. Ltd. & Ors.; (2000) 3 SCC 269.




Supreme Court's Division Bench grants bail, Justice Sandeep Kumar had declined bail to the accused with "no criminal antecedent"

In Md. Saheb vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and K.V. Viswanathan passed a 3-page long order on May 1, 2025 saying, "taking into account the nature of the offence and the period of incarceration, we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to be released on bail pending trial" after hearing the appeal against the order of Justice Sandeep Kumar of the Patna High Court rejecting the bail prayer of the appellant. The appellant's counsel submitted that  Md. Saheb, a resident of Basgaon, Abadpur, Katihar. has suffered incarceration of over seven months. The prosecution case against the appellant was based on recovery of Rs. 5,300/- cash and a mobile

But as far as the cash is concerned, it has not been identified as a looted article and the mobile which has been recovered is not connected with the crime. It was submitted that First Information Report was lodged against unknown persons and co-accused has already been granted bail. The order recorded that the State's counsel "could not point out any previous criminal antecedents of the appellant rather, in paragraph 17 of the counter affidavit, it is admitted that appellant has no criminal antecedent."  

In Md. Saheb vs. The State of Bihar (2025), in his 2-page order dated February 21, 2025 Justice Sandeep Kumar  concluded: "this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner." The petitioner had sought bail in connection with police case registered for the offence under Section 309(4) of the BNS which provides punishment for robbery which is rigorous imprisonment for a term that may extend to ten years, and a fine. The prosecution case was that four unknown criminals are alleged to have looted Rs. 55,805/-, one Tab etc. from the informant. Rs. 5300/- and one mobile phone was recovered from the petitioner and the petitioner had given a self-inculpatory statement. The petitioner is in jail since August 5, 2024. The petitioner's application was dismissed.


Justice Arun Kumar Jha sets aside rejection order of Sub Judge-VI, Patna in a Title Suit from Phulwari Sharif

In Farkunda Shahin & Ors. vs. Md. Mokhtar Alam & Ors. (2025), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court in his 17-page long judgement dated April 30, 2025 concluded: "I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 20.09.2016 could not be sustained and same is set aside and the application dated 08.04.2016 is allowed. Accordingly, the present petition stands allowed." In this case from Phulwari Sharif, the order dated 20.09.2016 passed by Sub Judge-VI, Patna in Title Suit No. 482 of 2006 whereby and whereunder the trial court had rejected the petition dated 08.04.2016 filed under Order 1 Rule 10(2) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the petitioners to be added as defendants in the suit.

The trial court had heard the parties and rejected the prayer for impleadment vide order dated 20.09.2016. This order was challenged before the High Court. The petitioners' counsel submitted that the impugned order is not sustainable and the trial court has passed the orders against the settled provision of law. The senior counsel further submitted that due to the mistake of the scribe, a wrong plot no. has been mentioned in the sale deed of the vendors and also in the sale deed of the petitioners but other description like Tauzi No., Khata No., area and boundary are the same. Further, a property could be identified by its boundary and misdescription or wrong mentioning of plot number would not come in the way of identifying the property. But this fact was not considered by the trial court. The counsel referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sheodhyan Singh And Others vs Musammat Santchara Kuer And Others reported in AIR 1963 SC 1879 wherein the Court referred to the decision of the Privy Council wherein it was observed that a case of misdescription could be treated as a mere irregularity where there is no doubas to the identity of the property and if identity of the property is well established, misdescription does not affect the identity of the property sold and thus, Supreme Court held that the mistake in plot number must be treated as mere misdescription which does not affect the identity of the property sold. The senior counsel also submitted that moreover plot number 797 is part of Khata no. 46 and this is the admitted position in the plaint of the plaintiffs. This fact is also clear from making the vendors of the petitioners, namely Muneshwar Rai and Nazir Rai, as parties/defendants. They were made parties only on the ground that they were admittedly the title holder of Plot No. 796 but they have nothing to do with the Plot No. 797. Thus, the petitioners are bona fide purchasers from Muneshwar Rai and Nazir Rai of Plot No. 796 and are in exclusive possession of the same. The trial court failed to exercise its jurisdiction and did not consider the real dispute in issue and rejected the petition of the petitioner on misconceived grounds. Prior to the sale of the disputed property to the petitoners, Muneshwar Rai and Nazir Rai partitioned their property in half and got their names recorded in Government Sarista of the State of Bihar and jamabandi was created in their names and mutation was also done in the names of the petitioners. The senior counsel reiterated that Plot No. 797 comes under Khata No. 46 having area 11 decimal with different boundary and neither the plaintiffs not the intervenors/petitioners have any concern with the said plot of land. The senior counsel further submitted that the vendors of the petitioners have already sold the suit land and they have no interest in the suit property and might not properly contest the suit. This makes the petitioners necessary parties for proper disposal of the suit. The senior counsel also submitted that the petitioners are necessary parties having right, title and possession over one of the plots of the Schedule II property and their interest would be jeopardized if they are not made parties and it would also result in multiplicity of litigation. Thus, it has been submitted by the senior counsel that the impugned order is not sustainable and the same be set aside and the application of the petitioners for impleadment be allowed. 

Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code reads: “(2) Court may strike out or add parties The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name, of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.”

Supreme Court in the case of Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal, reported in (2005) 6 SCC 733, has held that ‘necessary parties’ are those persons in whose absence no decree can be passed by the Court or that there must be a right to some relief against some party in respect of the controversy involved in the proceedings. On the other hand ‘proper parties’ are those whose presence before the Court would be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit although no relief in the suit was claimed against such person.

The Supreme Court in the case of Sumtibai vs. Paras Finance Co. Regd. Partnership Firm Beawer (Raj.), reported in (2007) 10 SCC 82, has held that a party having a semblance of interest in the suit property could be impleaded as a party in the suit.

In the case of Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. vs. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd., reported in (2010) 7 SCC 417 has discussed the law relating to impleadment of the parties. The relevant paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 22, 25 & 27 of the judgment reads:
“13. The general rule in regard to impleadment of parties is that the plaintiff in a suit, being dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a person
against whom he does not seek any relief. Consequently, a person who is not a party has no right to be impleaded against the wishes of the plaintiff. But this general rule is subject to the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (“the Code”, impleadment of proper or necessary parties...
14. The said provision makes it clear that a court may, at any stage of the proceedings (including suits for specific performance), either upon or even without any application, and on such terms as may appear to it to be just, direct that any of the following persons may be added as a party: (a) any person who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, but not added; or (b) any person whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle the questions involved in the suit. In short, the court is given the discretion to add as a party, any person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party.
15. A “necessary party” is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the court. If a “necessary party” is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A “proper party” is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance.
22. Let us consider the scope and ambit of Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC regarding striking out or adding parties. The said sub-rule is not about the right of a non-party to be impleaded as a party, but about the judicial discretion of the court to strike out or add parties at any stage of a proceeding. The discretion under the sub-rule can be exercised either suo motu or on the application of the plaintiff or the defendant, or on an application of a person who is not a party to the suit. The court can strike out any party who is improperly joined. The court can add anyone as a plaintiff or as a defendant if it finds that he is a necessary party or proper party. Such deletion or addition can be without any conditions or subject to such terms as the court deems fit to impose. In exercising its judicial discretion under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the
Code, the court will of course act according to reason and fair play and not according to whims and caprice.
25. In other words, the court has the discretion to either to allow or reject an application of a person claiming to be a proper party, depending upon the facts and circumstances and no person has a right to insist that he should be impleaded as a party, merely because he is a proper party.
27. On a careful examination of the facts of this case, we find that the appellant is neither a necessary party nor a proper party. As noticed above, the appellant is neither a purchaser nor the lessee of the suit property and has no right, title or interest therein. The first respondent-plaintiff in the suit has not sought any relief against the appellant. The presence of the appellant is not necessary for passing an effective decree in the suit for specific performance. Nor is its presence necessary for complete and effective adjudication of the matters in issue in the suit for specific performance filed by the first respondent-plaintiff against AAI. A person who expects to get a lease from the defendant in a suit for specific performance in the event of the suit being dismissed, cannot be said to be a person having some semblance of title in the property in dispute”.

Drawing on these judgements of the Supreme Court, Justice Jha observed: "...merely on this ground that disputed plot number does not match with the plot number of the petitioners, the rejection of the claim of the petitioners for impleadment is not proper. It is the settled provision of law that a land would be identified by its boundary and if its identity is established and the same is certain, mere misdescription would not come in the way of asserting rights by its title holder."