Why is CNLU using Google Form Link ignoring cyber security, not disclosig names of outsourcing agencies

Chanakya National Law University (CNLU), Patna published an advertisement dated May 28, 2025 seeking applications for Professor of Practice (on 3 Year Contract)–Practice Track in the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Investigation domain. The eligibility criteria for this position states "Professionals such as CISOs, ACISOs, CTOs, Director–IT with at least a Master’s Degree in Computer Science, Information Technology, Computer Applications or equivalent professional qualification from a reputed national or international institution, or a related field can be considered for the position of Professor of Practice." 

CNLU's advertisement states that it can dispense with the requirement of Ph.D. if the candidate can offset it by the demonstrated domain knowledge obtained from deep experience in the field of designing and teaching cyber security courses. This post requires a minimum 15 years of managerial or professional experience out of which at least 5 years in designing, developing and delivering Masters/Diploma Cyber Security courses to LEAs, PSUs, Govt Departments, IT Industry is mandatory. The advertisement reads:"Globally recognised Cyber Security certifications are must like CISSP/CISM/CISA." 

CNLU has asked the interested candidates to upload their filled-in scanned application form with relevant annexures through the following Google Form Link, latest by 10th June, 2025. https://forms.gle/MSyewgqQBBHRPJrn8 

It informs that the 1."selected candidate is expected to teach in different programmes as per the norms of the CNLU Patna" 

2. to promote industry-CNLU Patna linkages through consulting assignments/MDPs and 

3. to be involved in placements and academic activities.

A notice of placement dated June 7, 2025 has been published on the website of Chanakya National Law University (CNLU), Patna informing the law graduates that the Board of Revenue, Government of Bihar is looking for law experts. The Board "wants to fill-in some Law Experts position on contractual basis, through outsourcing agencies, who will be placed in the various districts of Bihar. They will be required to work full-time in the said department for the purposes of auction, preparing SOP in the field of land-related matters etc. The selected candidates will be paid Rs. 32,000/- in hand per month by the agency." In the interest of transparency CNLU must disclose the credentials of the outsourcing agencies in question. Why are these agencies afraid of sun-light? Isn't sun-light the best disinfectant? 

The notice reads:"All such students who are interested in joining the said position are requested to fill in their details through the following Google Form Link latest by Tuesday, the 10th June, 2025: 

https://forms.gle/ntBRb49CA3AGFBZU6 

The applicants will be shortlisted on the basis of their UG/PG marks and it would be sent to the outsourcing agencies for further course of action. The tentative number of vacancies may be around 40 to 50." The notice clarifies that "CNLU is just a facilitator and is NOT involved in the selection process."

The advertisement and the notice of placement raise three questions:  

Is CNLU aware that use Google Form Link which keeps a "permanent record" of the applicants, compromises the cyber security of the applicants? Does it approve of such permanent record keeping?

It can be a tool for phishing or collecting sensitive information. Office of Information Security, Washington University in St. Louis has issued an alert entitled: Phishing Alert: Credential Phishing via Google Form. Its advice reads:"You should never enter your credentials into a Google Form."

Google Form is designed to share and collect information. The Google Form's trusted status provides advantages to phishers. It enables malicious link delivery. It creates illusion of cyber security because of its trusted domain. It gets deemed as plausible form. As a consequence, forms linked from phishing emails seeking additional information get blindly trusted. Many shared document repositories are publicly available, it enables cyber criminals to insert phishing documents into legitimate corporate drives. These threats are relevant for Google Doc and Google Drive as well.  

Why is CNLU not disclosing names of outsourcing agencies hired by the Board of Revenue, Government of Bihar? 

Benefit of doubt, if any, must be given to accused: Patna High Court

The benefit of doubt, if any, be given to the accused, the principles which were laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Hanumant Govind Nargundkar vs. State of M.P. reported in (1952) 2 SCC 71. Recalling this decision, Patna High Court's Division Bench led by Justice V.M. Pancholi set aside the impugned judgment of conviction dated September 4, 2014 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, III, Khagaria in Sessions Trial of 2010 arising out of a case of 2010. The appellant was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.10,000. The accused/appellant was acquitted of the charges levelled against him by the High Court's judgement dated August 25, 2023 in Amarnath Swarnkar vs. The State of Bihar (2023) was authored by Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha. 

The High Court was took a guidance from Supreme Court's decision in Sarad Vridhi Chandra Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 1984 (4) SCC 116, wherein the principles of “Panchsheel” was laid down, which must require to be established in a case based upon circumstantial evidence, as of present, which is as under:-
152. "It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground far a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."

153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra (') where the following observations were made: "Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions." (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say. they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 

154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence."

Right to Privacy of Adolescents

In RE: Right to Privacy of Adolescents (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan) observed:"After having read the reports and having interacted with the Committee as well as the victim, we are of the view that if we send the accused to jail, the worst sufferer will be the victim herself. As compared to the situation in 2018, she is better placed today. Now she is comfortable with her small family. She along with the accused, is concentrating on their daughter and the want to ensure that she gets quality education. At the same time, as recorded in the final report, the victim is attending school and is desperate to complete her school education. Though the State has offered to enroll her in some vocational course, she is keen on completing her education, at least up to graduation."

The Criminal Appeal was preferred by the State of West Bengal against the judgment and order dated October 18, 2023, passed ny a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. In Suo Motu Writ Petition, Supreme Court’s attention was drawn to certain objectionable observations made in the High Court's judgement. The  former court took note of the systemic failure of the State to protect the victim, resulting in her fate and wellbeing being ultimately tied up with that of the accused. Accordingly, in this judgement, we are dealing with the issue of sentencing the accused arising out of the criminal appeal and the

In the Suo Motu Writ Petition, the Court dealt with are the issue of rehabilitation of the victim and her child. The Suo Motu writ petition was initiated based on the directions issued by the  Chief Justice of India for challenging the impugned judgment. The State Government had preferred the criminal appeal to challenge the order of acquittal.

The Court considered three issues. The first issue is of sentencing the accused. The second issue is about the rehabilitation of the victim and her child. The third issue is a wider issue about adopting measures for adolescent wellbeing and child protection which goes to the root cause of the problem in our changing society. 

The Court relied on the reports of the Court appointed  3-member Committee of Experts. In its preliminary report, it recorded "the victim’s struggles while tackling the legal system for securing the release of the accused." The final report provided details of all the interviews conducted by the Committee, including those off the victim, the accused, their respective families, teachers and management personnel at the school of the victim, investigating police officers, personnel at the welfare home—Sanlaap Sneha Home, and other relevant stakeholders. It highlighted the inadequate, inefficient implementation of the POCSO Act. It emphasized the “collective failure of the systems that are there to protect a girl child”. It stated that the loopholes were glaring, and that the elopement, the living in/marriage of the victim, the birth of a child—all were preventable. 

The final report had specifically highlighted the failure of the Child Protection Committees at the village level; the inadequate implementation of the State of West Bengal’s “Kanyashree Prakalpa Scheme”;the inaction of the designated Child Welfare Officer at the local police station;lack of provision of free legal aid; lack of sufficient and effective counsellors from both genders in schools and even welfare homes;high frequency of elopements by children in class 8 and above;stigmatisation of girls in similar situations as the adolescent victim in the present case; irregularities and delays in the investigation of such crimes;inadequate accessibility to judicial fora and corruption and financial exploitation by touts, members of the Bar etc.; and lack of awareness and sensitisation among family, and public officials in respect of the POCSO Act and the sexual, emotional, and mental well-being of children.

The final report concluded that "in this particular case, it was not the legal crime which caused trauma on the victim, rather it was the legal battle which ensued consequent to the crime that is taking a toll on the victim."

The final report also concluded that though the incident was seen as a crime in law, the victim did not accept it as one. The Committee records that it was not the legal crime that caused any trauma to the victim, but rather, it was the consequences that followed, which took a toll on her. What she had to face as a consequence was the police, the legal system and the constant battle to save the accused from punishment. At the same time, she took care of her daughter to the best of her abilities, notwithstanding the huge financial burden she carried." 

The final conclusion in the report is an eye opener. It reads:

“In conclusion, a heinous crime causes trauma in the psyche of the victim. In this case, the law saw it as a crime, the victim did not. Hence, the legal crime did not cause any trauma on this particular victim. It was the consequences thereafter – the police personnel, the legal system, the battle to save her husband and do the best for her daughter while having a financial burden, which is taking its toll on her. A young woman, who refuses to be called a “Victim”, fighting for her husband needs all the support that can be made available. It would be in the best interest of the child if the family structure can be restored.”

The judgment noted: "Though the victim did not treat the incident as a heinous crime, she suffered because of it. This was because at an earlier stage, the victim could not make an informed choice due to the shortcomings of our society, our legal system and her family. In fact, she did not get any opportunity to make informed choice. The society judged her, the legal system failed her, and her own family abandoned her. Now, she is at a stage where she is desperate to save her husband. Now, she is emotionally committed to the accused and has become very possessive of her small family."

The Special Judge appointed under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) had convicted the accused for the offences punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Sections 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. For the offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, the accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for twenty years and pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-. For the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC, thea accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years and five years respectively and was also ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-and Rs.5,000/- respectively. Though the Special Judge under the POCSO Act came to the conclusion that the accused was guilty of the offences punishable under clause (n) of sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) of Section 376 of the IPC, in view of the sentence imposed for the offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, no separate punishment was imposed. The accused preferred Criminal Appeal (DB) 14 of 2023 before the Calcutta High Court against the conviction. The High Court by the Impugned Judgement dated October 18, 2023 purported to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to set aside the conviction of the accused for the aforesaid offences. 

By a detailed judgement dated August 20, 2024, the Supreme Court had set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restored the verdict of the Special Court to the extent of the conviction of the accused for the offences punishable under clause (n) of sub-section 2 and sub-section (3) of Section 376 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. This Court confirmed the acquittal of the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC. However, the sentencing was postponed for the reasons recorded in the judgment. In paragraph 2 of the said judgment, the basic facts of the case have been mentioned and in paragraph 3, the findings recorded by the High Court have been mentioned. 

The paragraphs 2 to 5 of the High Court's judgment reads: “2. The victim girl was fourteen years old at the time of the incident. The victim’s mother lodged a First Information Report (FIR) on 29th May 2018. The victim’s mother stated in her complaint that the victim, who was her minor daughter, escaped from her home at 5:30 p.m. on 20th May 2018 without informing anyone. On inquiry, it was found that the accused enticed her to leave her house. The accused did so with the help of his two sisters. The victim’s mother repeatedly visited the house of the accused and requested him to facilitate the return of her daughter. However, the victim did not come back. A female child was born to the victim. Admittedly, the accused is the biological father of the child. There was a gross delay in the investigation, and the accused was arrested on 19th December 2021. The chargesheet was filed on 27th January 2022 against the accused for the offences for which he was convicted. In addition, the accused was charged with the offence punishable under Section 9 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. The prosecution examined seven witnesses. We may note here that as the learned Special Judge under the POCSO Act found that there was no evidence of marriage between the victim and the accused, the charge under Section 9 of the 2006 Act was held as not substantiated."

Significantly, the High Court noted that the mother of the victim had disowned her and therefore, the victim was continuously residing with the accused along with their minor child.

The Supreme Court observed: "In law, we have no option but to sentence the accused and send him to jail for undergoing the minimum punishment prescribed by the Statute. However, in this case, the society, the family of the victim and the legal system have done enough injustice to the victim. She has been subjected to enough trauma and agony. We do not want to add to the injustice done to the victim by sending her husband to jail. We as Judges, cannot shut our eyes to these harsh realities. Now, at this stage, in order to do real justice to the victim, the only option left before us is to ensure that the accused is not separated from the victim. The State and the society must ensure that the family is rehabilitated till the family settles down in all respects."

It opined:"Ultimately, this Court is bestowed with extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 for the sole a position to do substantial justice in its truest sense. In the context of this situation, sadly, true justice lies in not sentencing the accused to undergo imprisonment. This case is not going to be a precedent and should not be a precedent. This case is an illustration of the complete failure of our society and our legal system. All that the system can do for the victim now, is to help her fulfil her desire of completing her education, settling down in life, providing a better education to her daughter and ensuring overall better living conditions for her family. This year we have completed 75 years of the Constitution on 26th January. The Constitution contemplates the State to be a welfare state. The Constitution guaranteed social and economic justice to all the citizens. In this case, there is a failure to provide both social and economic justice to the victim. The facts of the case indicate failure of the concept of welfare state. To remedy the situation in this case, it is the obligation of the State Government to act as the true guardian of the victim and her child and ensure that they settle down in life and lead a happy, healthy and constructive life ahead."

The 44-page long judgement reads: "we pass the following order: a) We exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and hold that though the accused stands convicted, he will not undergo sentence for the reasons stated earlier; b)We direct the State to take following measures: i) To act as a true guardian of the victim and her child; ii) To provide a better shelter to the victim and her family within a period of few months from today; iii) To bear the entire expenditure of the education of the victim till Xth standard examination and if she desires to take up education for a degree course, till the completion of degree course. After she passes her Xth standard examination, the we pass the following order: a) We exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and hold that though the accused stands convicted, he will not undergo sentence for the reasons stated earlier;

b) We direct the State to take following measures:

i) To act as a true guardian of the victim and her child;

ii) To provide a better shelter to the victim and her family within a period of few months from today;

iii) To bear the entire expenditure of the education of the victim till Xth standard examination and if she desires to take up education for a degree course, till the completion of degree course. After she passes her Xth standard examination, the State can offer her vocational training, obviously, at the cost of the State;

iv) To bear the entire expenditure of the education of the child up to Xth standard and ensuring that she is educated in a very good school in the vicinity of the place of residence of the victim; and

v) To endeavour to take the assistance of NGOs or public-spirited citizens for the purpose of securing the debts incurred by the victim as a one-time measure." 

Justice Vipul Pancholi to take over as Patna High Court Chief Justice, dismissed State Government Appeals against acquittal of 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2024

Justice Vipul M. Pancholi is all set to take charge as Chief Justice of Patna High Court after Supreme Court Collegium recommended his appointment. He was transferred from Gujarat High Court to Patna High Court and took oath as Judge, Patna High Court on July 24, 2023. Justice Pancholi did his Bachelor of Science (Electronics) from St. Xavier's College, Ahmedabad, Gujarat University and Master of Law in Commercial Group from Sir L.A. Shah Law College, Ahmedabad, Gujarat University. He entered the Bar in September 1991 and started practice as an advocate in the High Court of Gujarat. He was appointed as Assistant Government Pleader and Additional Public Prosecutor, High Court of Gujarat and served as such for seven years till March 2006. He was Honorary Joint Editor of Law Reporter-The Gujarat Law Herald for two years. He worked as visiting faculty at Sir L.A. Shah Law College, Ahmedabad from December 1993 for twenty one years. As an Advocate, he conducted important cases in various branches of law, viz. criminal law, civil law, property law, service law, family law, banking law and other laws.  He was elevated as Additional Judge, Gujarat High Court on October 1, 2014 and confirmed as permanent Judge on June 10, 2016. He was born on May 28,1968 at Ahmedabad.

On the first day at the Patna High Court he was part of the Division Bench headed by Justice Ashutosh Kumar which pronounced their 19-page long judgement in Rupchand Kewat vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2023) wherein it set aside the judgement and order of the  2nd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hilsa at Nalanda, which had convicted the appellants under Section 304(B)/34 and 201/34 of the Indian Penal Code and had sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and rigorous imprisonment for 7 years for the offences under Sections 304(B) and 201/34 of the I.P.C. respectively along with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The judgement was authored by Justice Kumar.  

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his first judgement four days after joining the Patna High Court in Shankar Yadav & Ors. vs. The State Of Bihar (2023) and Jagdeo Yadav  vs. The State Of Bihar (2023) wherein he upheld the judgment and order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Rosera, Samastipur in a Sessions Trial in a case whose arose in 2012. The Trial Court had convicted the appellants/accused person from Muzaffarpur for the offences punishable under Sections-302 read with 149, 148 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code and the appellants/accused are sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.10,000/-for the offences punishable under Sections-302/149 of the Indian Penal Code. In his 13-page long judgement dated July 28, 2023, Justice Pancholi observed that the Trial Court did not commit any error while passing the impugned order.  

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, he authored his second 26-page long judgement dated August 2, 2023 in Kamakhya Giri vs. The State of Bihar (2023), wherein the judgment of conviction and order of sentence of March 2019 by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge (NDPS) Act, Aurangabad was upheld. It arose out of a case from 2016, whereby all the appellants were convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 8-20 (b) ii (C) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 14 years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,50,000/- each and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for six months each.

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, he authored his third 25-page long judgement dated August 18, 2023 in Mani Kant Singh@ Tunna Singh vs The State of Bihar (2023) wherein the judgment of conviction and order of January, 2014 by Additional Sessions Judge-I, Sitamarhi in a Session Trial of 2013 in a case which arose in 2011 was set aside. The appellant, namely, Mani Kant Singh @ Tunna Singh was acquitted of the charges levelled against him by the trial court. He felt a persuaded by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bahal Singh Vs. State of Haryana reported in AIR 1976 SC 2032. The Supreme Court had noted that the Trial Cpurt hd grave doubts about the presence of two prosecution witnesses at the time and place of occurrence. It observed: "If by coincidence or chance a person happens to be at the place of occurrence at the time it is taking place, he is called a chance witness. And if such a person happens to be a relative or friend of the victim or inimically disposed towards the accused then his being a chance witness is viewed with suspicion. Such a piece of evidence is not necessarily incredible or unbelievable but does require cautious and close scrutiny." It had underlined that "There was not any compelling or sufficient reason for the High Court to differ from the evaluation of the evidence of the two chance witnesses. It may well be as remarked by the High Court that the respondent was also their collateral but they appeared to be partisan witnesses on the side of the prosecution and hence their testimony was viewed with suspicion by the trial Judge.” The appellants' counsel also relied upon the decisions the Supreme Court in the case of Virendra Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 2022 SC 3373, Raja Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 2005 (5) SCC 272, Assoo Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2011 (14) SCC 448 and Javed Masood and Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 2010 SC 979.

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, he authored his fourth 35-page judgement dated August 22, 2023 in Brahmdeo Sahni vs.The State of Bihar (2023) wherein the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence March 2015 by Additional District and Sessions Judge-7, Begusarai in connection with Session Trial of 2009 arising out of a case  of 2009 was set aside. The appellants, namely, Brahmdeo Sahni in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.521 of 2015 and Parmanand Sah in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.418 of 2015 were acquitted of the charges levelled against them by the trial court for the offences punishable under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. He directed Patna High Court Legal Services Committee to pay Rs.5,000/ to Ms. Surya Nilambari, the Amicus Curiae for the assistance she rendered to the Court.

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his fifth 18-page long judgement dated August 22, 2023 in Bhimal Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2023), wherein he quashed and set aside the judgment of conviction from May 2015 and order of sentence by 3rd Additional District & Sessions Judge, Barh, Patna in a Session Trial of 2006 in a case which arose in 2001 are quashed and set aside. The appellant was acquitted of the charges levelled against him for the offence punishable with rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and a fine of Rs. 10,000 only for offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act. The Court observed, "Fine, if any paid by the appellant, be returned to him immediately."

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 6th 25-page long judgement dated August 24, 2023 in Bhantu Rai @ Mantu Rai vs. The State of Bihar (2023) through the Informant Nitesh Kumar. He acquitted Bhantu Rai @ Mantu Rai of the charges levelled against him in the judgment of March 2015 by Additional District and Sessions Judge-1st, Sitamarhi in a Sessions Trial of 2013 whereby the appellant was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 148 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 27 of Arms Act, arising out of a case of 2012. 

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 7th 23-page long judgement dated August 28, 2023 in Sudistha Singh @ Sudishtha Singh vs.The State of Bihar (2023), wherein he set aside the judgment of conviction dated March 30, 2016 by 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Sitamarhi in Session Trial of 2013 arising out of a case of 2011. The appellant, namely, Sudistha Singh @ Sudishtha Singh acquitted of the charges levelled against him by the learned trial court. He was directed to be released forthwith.

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 8th 16-page long judgement dated August 29, 2023 in Sanjay Kumar Singh vs.The State of Bihar (2023), wherein the judgement reads: "we are of the view that the prosecution has proved the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant has committed the offence punishable under Section 302 of the I.P.C. and the case of the appellant does not fall under Exception 4 of Section 300 of the I.P.C. and, therefore, he cannot be convicted under Section 304 Part-II of the I.P.C. as alternatively contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. Thus, no error is committed by Learned Trial Court while passing impugned order." The Additional Sessions Judge - IV, Saran, Chapra convicted appellant by judgement dated May 22, 2015 and had passed order of sentence dated May 28 May, 2015 in Sessions Trial of 2014 which arose out of a case of 2013. The Trial Court had convicted the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 302 of I.P.C. and under Section 27(3) of the Indian Arms Act, 1959. He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of life and a fine of Rs. 15,000/- under Section 302 of the I.P.C. and 5 years R.I. under Section 27(1) of the Arms Act and a fine of Rs. 5,000/. Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 9th 23-page long judgement dated August 29, 2023 in Bajrang Shankar vs.The National Investigation Agency, Patna (2023), wherein in the penultimate paragraph, he concluded:"A fortiori, we deem it proper to reverse the order passed by the High Court granting bail to the respondent. Instead, we agree with the conclusion recorded by the Designated Court that in the facts of the present case, the respondent is not entitled to grant of bail in connection with the stated offences, particularly those falling under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act....the impugned judgment and order [Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali v. NIA, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 11185] is set aside and, instead, the order passed by the Designated Court rejecting the application for grant of bail made by the respondent herein, is affirmed....we are of the view that the appellant is not entitled to be released on bail". 

Notably, Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Pancholi and Chandra Shekhar Jha set aside the judgement dated September 13, 2018 passed by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court comprising Justices Dr. S. Muralidhar and Vinod Goel which had concluded: "this Court holds, for the limited purposes of the present appeal, that there are no reasonable grounds to form an opinion at this stage that the accusations against the Appellant under the UAPA are prima facie true. The Court is also not satisfied at this stage that there is prima facie material to show the involvement of the Appellant in any criminal conspiracy with the other accused justifying the accusations for the offences under Section 120-B IPC or Section 121, 121-A, 124-A IPC. The duty of the Court at this stage is not to weigh the evidence meticulously but to arrive at a finding on the basis of broad probabilities....The impugned order dated 8th June, 2018 of the trial Court is accordingly set aside. The Appellant is directed to be released on bail..."

Significantly, the Delhi High Court judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court. The Patna High Court's Division quoted para 56 of the Supreme Court judgment which reversed the Delhi High Court's verdict. 

Patna High Court's Division Bench had passed the judgement after hearing the appellant who had filed a bail application in the pending trial in a Special Case of 2019 before the Special Judge, NIA Act, Patna which was dismissed vide order dated September 28, 2021 in the matter of F.I.R. of 2018 at Muffasil Police Station in the District of Munger, under Sections-121, 379, 414 and 120B/34 of Indian Penal Code, Sections-25(1A), 25(1AA), 25(1-B)(a) and Sections- 26 and 35 of the Arms Act read with Section-39 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (U.A.P.A.) relating to recovery of 3 A.K.-47 weapons and arrest of two persons who were involved in supply of A.K.-47 weapons to Maoists and other criminals in various States from Army Armory, Jabalpur, Bhopal. All together 26 persons were named in the category of accused in the F.I.R. The appellant was not named in the F.I.R but during course of investigation, he was implicated and arrested and he has been in custody since January 6, 2019. His counsel had relied on decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. K. Najeeb, reported in (2021) 3 SCC 713, particularly para-17 and 18 of the judgment and para 14 of the decision in Mohd Muslim @ Hussain Vs. State (NCT OF DELHI) in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No(s). 915 of 2023. 

In Bajrang Shankar vs.The National Investigation Agency, Patna, Additional Solicitor General had relied upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of National Investigation Agency Vs. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, reported in (2019) 5 SCC 1 and sought dismissal of the appeal.

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 10th 16-page long judgement dated August 30, 2023 in Latyain Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2023) concluded:'we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the Trial Court has committed an error while passing the order of conviction against the appellants." He set aside the impugned judgment of conviction dated June 22, 2016 and order of sentence dated June 23, 2016 passed by 2nd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Jamui in connection with Sessions Trial which arose out of case of 2012. The appellants, namely, Latyain Yadav in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.720 of 2016 and Jagdeo Yadav in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1024 of 2016 were acquitted by the High Court of the charges levelled against them by the trial court. Both were convicted and sentenced to undergo R.I. for life and fine of Rs.10,000/- each for the offences punishable under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code by the Trial Court.

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 11th 19-page long judgement dated August 31, 2023 in Kisto Paswan  vs. The State of Bihar (2023) concluded:"we are of the view that the Trial Court has committed an error while recording the order of conviction against the present appellant and, therefore, the impugned order is required to be quashed and set aside." The impugned judgment of conviction dated March 6, 2017 and order of sentence dated March 8, 2017 for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code by Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court-I, Nalanda at Bihar Sharif in Session Trial Case of 2006/649 of 2007/434 of 2008 which arose out of 2005 case was quashed and set aside. 

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 12th 30-page long judgement dated September 4, 2023 in Ashok Kumar Singh @ Ashok Chaudhary vs. The State of Bihar (2023) drawing on Supreme Court's decision in Shailendra Rajdev Pasvan & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors, reported in (2020) 14 SCC 750.  In para 17, the Supreme Court observed:“It is well settled by now that in a case based on circumstantial evidence the courts ought to have a conscientious approach and conviction ought to be recorded only in case all the links of the chain are complete pointing to the guilt of the accused. Each link unless connected together to form a chain may suggest suspicion but the same in itself cannot take place of proof and will not be sufficient to convict the accused.”

Justice Pancholi observed in the penultimate paragraph:"Thus, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that each link, unless connected together to form a chain, may suggest suspicion but the same in itself cannot take place of proof and will not be sufficient to convict the accused. It is further revealed from the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
aforesaid decisions that the circumstance of last seen together does not by itself and necessarily lead to the inference that it was the accused who had committed the crime. It is a primary principle that the accused “must be” and not merely “may be” guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. The prosecution must stand or fall on its own legs and it cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the defence. Keeping in view the aforesaid decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, if the evidence of the prosecution as discussed hereinabove is examined, it is revealed that the prosecution has failed to prove the chain from which it can be established that the present appellant/accused only committed the alleged offense and none else."  

The Division Bench of the High Court quashed and set aside the impugned judgment of conviction dated April 9, 2015 and order of sentence dated April 16, 2015 by Ad0hoc Additional Sessions Judge-II, Begusarai in a Sessions Trial of 1993 which arose out of a case of 1993. The appellant was acquitted of the charges levelled against him by the trial court. He was directed to be released from jail forthwith. The trial court had convicted the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 364, 302 and 34 of the IPC.

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 13th 33-page long judgement dated September 5, 2023 in Chandan Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2023), wherein he quashed and set aside the impugned judgment of conviction dated August 21, 2019 and order of sentence dated August 26, 2019 by 1st Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge POCSO Act & SC/ST Act, Bhojpur, Ara in a POCSO case of 2018 which arose out of Bihia Police Station case of 2018. The appellants, namely, Chandan Singh in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1142 of 2019, Ramjee Singh in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1168 of 2019 and Yuvraj Singh in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1169 of 2019 were acquitted of the charges levelled against them by the learned Trial Court. They were directed to be released from jail forthwith." The trial court had convicted the appellants for the offences punishable under Section 376-D of the IPC, under Section 6 of the  Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act and under Section 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.  

The counsel of the appellants had relied upon the decisions rendered by thee Supreme Court in the cases of (i) Jarnail Singh vs. State of Haryana, reported in 2013 Cr.L.J. 3976, (ii) Rajak Mohammad vs. State of H.P. reported in (2018) 9 SCC 248, (iii) Sunil vs. State of Haryana reported in AIR 2010 SC 392 (iv) State of M.P. vs. Munna @ Shambhoo Nath reported in (2016) 1 SCC 696 and the decision rendered by the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Anil Kumar and Anr. vs. State of Bihar reported in 2023 (4) BLJ 562 Criminal Appeal (DB) No.417 of 2020.

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 14th 27-page long judgement dated September 14, 2023 in Manoj Bhuiyan vs. The State of Bihar (2023), wherein  he concluded that that "there is no eye-witness to the incident in question and the case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence." He heard the appeal against the judgment of conviction dated June 1, 2013 and order of sentence dated June 7, 2013, by Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge-V, Aurangabad (Bihar) in Sessions Trial of 2011 which arose out of a P.S. case of 2011, whereby the concerned Trial Court had convicted the sole appellant for the offences punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and had sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. Amicus Curiae for the appellant relied the decisions by the Supreme Court in the cases of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1622, Anjan Kumar Sarma Vs. State of Assam SCC 359, Ravi vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2018) 16 SCC 102 and Reena Hazarika vs. State of Assam, reported in (2019) 3 SCC 289.

Justice Pancholi observed: "It may be interesting to note that as regards the mode of proof in a criminal case depending on circumstantial evidence, in the absence of a corpus delicti, the statement of law as to proof of the same was laid down by Gresson, J. (and concurred by 3 more Judges) in The King v. Horry, (1952) NZLR 111, thus: “Before he can be convicted, the fact of death should be proved by such circumstances as render the commission of the crime morally certain and leave no ground for reasonable doubt: the circumstantial evidence should be so cogent and compelling as to convince a jury that upon no rational hypothesis other than murder can the facts be accounted for.” 155. Lord Goddard slightly modified the expression ‘morally certain’ by ‘such circumstances as render the commission of the crime certain’. This indicates the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that a case can be said to be proved only when there is certain and explicit evidence and no person can be convicted on pure moral conviction."

Manoj Bhuiyan, the appellant was arrested on September 28, 2011 and he was in jail since almost approximately 12 years. He quashsd and set aside the impugned judgment of conviction by Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge-V, Aurangabad (Bihar). The appellant, namely, Manoj Bhuiyan was  acquitted of the charges levelled against him by the trial court. He was directed to be released forthwith. He directed Patna High Court Legal Services Committee to pay Rs.5,000 to Smiti Bharti, Amicus Curiae for the assistance to the Court.   

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his 15th 41-page long judgement dated September 18, 2023 in Ranjeet Thakur @ Ranjeet Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2023), wherein he observed:"we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove the complete chain and even the prosecution has also failed to prove by leading cogent evidence that the appellant-accused was lastly seen in the company of the deceased. Thus, the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, we are of the view that the appellant-accused is required to be acquitted." He quahed and set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated July 16, 2015 by 7th Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur in a Sessions Trial of 2013, which arose out of a P.S. Case of 2013, The Trial Court had convicted the sole appellant Ranjeet Thakur @ Ranjeet Kumar for the offences punishable under Sections- 376, 302, 120B of the IPC and had sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years under Section-376 of the I.P.C. and fine of Rs.10,000/-and in default of payment of fine, further to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. He had been further convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life till his death and fine of Rs.10,000.

Justice Pancholi led Division Bench dismisses State Government's appeal against 1999 judgement of acquittal by A.D.J.-XII, Patna in a Sessions Trial involving death of Raj Mahal Devi in 1995

In his last 31-page long judgement dated May 13, 2025 prior to the recommendation by Collegium, in The State of Bihar vs. Nawal Kishore Gope & Anr. (2025), Justice Pancholi led Division Bench which included Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra dismissed State Government's appeal of 1999 filed by the State against the judgment of acquittal is dismissed along with the revision application filed by the informant challenging the very same judgment of acquittal rendered by the Trial Court. The judgement was delivered after hearing the Government Appeal of 1999 and Criminal Revision case of 1999 Deepak Kumar vs.The State of Bihar & Ors (2025).  In the appeal, the second respondent was Kanhai Gope. In the revision case, the second and third respondents Nawal Kishore Gope and Kanhai Gope 

The State had preferred Govt. Appeal (DB) No.22 of 1999 under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgment dated July 27, 1999 passed by the court of A.D.J.-XII, Patna in Sessions Trial No. 319/96, arising out of Sultanganj P.S. Case No.258/95 whereby the Trial Court had acquitted both the accused persons, i.e. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, of all the charges levelled against them.

The prosecution case, as per the fardbeyan dated December 3, 1995 recorded at 20:00 hours given by Deepak Kumar in P.M.C.H. Emergency Ward is that on December 3, 1995 at 19:00 hours informant's mother Raj Mahal Devi was murdered. After filing of the F.I.R., the investigating agency carried out the investigation and, during the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer recorded the statement of the witnesses and collected the relevant documents and thereafter filed the charge-sheet against the accused. As the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions where it was registered for Sessions Trial. Before the Trial Court, prosecution examined seven witnesses.

A.P.P. appearing for the appellant/State submitted that there are eye-witnesses to the incident in question who have supported the case of the prosecution, despite which the Trial Court has discarded their deposition. It is contended that though the informant, Deepak Kumar had lodged the FIR against unknown persons and did not disclose the names of the assailants while giving fardbeyan, he had given the explanation for not giving the names of the assailants to the police while giving his fardbeyan. It was submitted that Gauri Shankar Yadav, the brother of the accused, while carrying the injured to the hospital in tempo had given threat to the informant and, therefore, he had not disclosed the names of the assailants at the relevant point of time. APP submitted that the medical evidence also supported the case of the prosecution and, in fact, informant, PW-4, who was an injured eye-witness who has supported the case of the prosecution. But the Trial Court did not believe the version given by him. APP also submitted that the Trial Court has committed grave error while acquitting the respondents/accused and, therefore, the impugned judgment be quashed and set aside and the present appeal be allowed.

The counsel for the respondents/accused submitted that for the alleged incident which took place at 07:00 p.m., the informant Deepak Kumar gave his fardbeyan at 08:00 p.m., i.e., within one hour in the hospital itself. But in his fardbeyan, he did not give the names of the assailants. It was submitted that the present respondents/accused have falsely been implicated because of family dispute between the parties and, in fact, the present respondent Nawal Yadav and his brother Gauri Shankar Yadav took the injured to the hospital. The respondents/accused referred the inquest report of the dead body of the deceased. It was submitted that, in fact, the respondent/accused, Nawal Kishore had signed the said inquest. Thus, he was very much present on the next day morning at 10:45 a.m. on December 4, 1995.

The respondents/accused further submitted that even the statement of the informant and the other two witnesses under Section 164 of the Code was recorded on January 5, 1996, after more than one month. The prosecution failed to prove the case against the respondents/accused beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the Trial Court has rightly passed the order of acquittal in favour of the respondents/accused. 

Justice Pancholi led Division Bench observed: "We are of the view that there are major contradictions, inconsistencies and improvements in the version given by the prosecution witnesses and, in fact, the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the respondents/accused beyond reasonable doubt. We have also gone through the reasoning recorded by the Trial Court and we are of the view that the Trial Court has not committed any error while passing the impugned judgment of acquittal."

The Division Bench referred to the decision rendered by the High Court in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.621 of 2023 (Purushottam Singh vs. State of Bihar & Anr.), wherein the Court has held in paragraph nos.18, 19 and 20 as under:
“18. It is pertinent to note that we are dealing with the acquittal appeal filed by the informant, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandrappa and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 has observed in paragraph no. 42 as under:-
“42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge;
(1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded;
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law;
(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

Justice Pancholi recalled the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nikhil Chandra Mondal vs. State of West Bengal, reported in (2023) 6 SCC 605 has observed in paragraph no. 22:- “22. Recently, a three-Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar has considered various earlier judgments on the scope of interference in a case of acquittal. It held that there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence that is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the court. It has been further held that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

Drawing on these decisions by Supreme Court, the High Court observed: "it can be said that there is double presumption in favour of the accused, when the order of acquittal has been accorded by the Trial Court, Firstly, the presumption of innocence that is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the court. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

Relying on the decision rendered by the Supreme Court, Justice Pancholi concluded: "if the present Government Appeal filed by the State against the order of acquittal is examined, we are of the view that the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record....no interference is required in the impugned judgment rendered by the Trial Court." The High Court also dismissed the revision application filed by the informant challenging the same judgment of acquittal rendered by the Trial Court. 

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Justice Pancholi led Division Bench had delivered almost similar 28-page long judgement dated May 12, 2025 in the State of Bihar vs. Bidhesh Paswan & Ors. (2025) and dismissed the State appeal of 1999 against the judgment of acquittal of 1999 by the Court of 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad in Sessions Trial of 1993, wherein the Trial Court had acquitted all the 15 respondents/accused of all the charges levelled against them. The judgement was authored by Justice Pancholi

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Justice Pancholi led Division Bench had delivered almost similar 28-page long judgement dated May 8, 2025 in the State of Bihar vs. Hardeo Manda & Ors. (2025) and dismissed the State appeal of 1998 against the judgment of acquittal of 1998 by the Court of 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Banka in Sessions Trial of 1997, wherein the Trial Court had acquitted all the three respondents/accused of all the charges levelled against them. The judgement was authored by Justice Pancholi

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Justice Pancholi led Division Bench had delivered almost similar 25-page long judgement dated May 7, 2025 in the State of Bihar vs. Harinandan Singh & Ors. (2025) and dismissed the State appeal of 1999 against the judgment of acquittal of 1997 by the Court of 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Nawada in Sessions Trial of 1994, wherein the Trial Court had acquitted all the 13 respondents/accused of all the charges levelled against them. The judgement was authored by Justice Pancholi.

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Justice Pancholi led Division Bench had delivered almost similar 13-page long judgement dated May 6, 2025 in the State of Bihar vs. Shashi Bhushan Pal & Ors. (2025) and dismissed the State appeal of 2024 against the judgment of acquittal of 2024 by the Court of 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Bhojpur at Ara in Sessions Trial of 2023 for the offence under for the offences registered under Sections 302, Section 307 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act, wherein the Trial Court had acquitted all the four respondents/accused of all the charges levelled against them. The judgement was authored by Justice Pancholi. 

The prosecution story was based on the fardbeyan of the informant, namely, Meera Kumari who has been examined as PW-4 in course of trial. In her fardbeyan recorded on October 1, 2022 at 13:45 hours (afternoon) by one Pramod Kumar Tiwari, Sub-Inspector of Police, Shastri Nagar Police Station, she alleged that on September 30, 2022 at about 10:00 P.M. in the night, the informant heard the sound of firing coming from the dalan and when she went there, she saw (1) Amarjeet Pal @ Chotu (2) Ramjeet Pal, (3) Indrajeet Pal, all three sons of Shiv Person Pal and (4) Shashi Bhushan Pal, son of Heera Lal Pal were fleeing away from the dalan. She also alleged that when the informant went inside the dalan, she saw her father’s elder brother was restless and was in a pool of blood. When she shouted, the people assembled there and they took him to Sadar Hospital, Ara for treatment where after treatment he was referred to Paras Hospital, Patna for better treatment. It was further alleged that the reason of this occurrence is that eight days ago, when the work of boundary wall of her dalan three sons came there armed with lathi-danda and started abusing and stopped the work. They had also threatened them of dire consequences if they start the work of boundary wall. The informant alleged that with an intention to usurp the land, the said accused persons had shot at her elder father in his abdomen. 

The High Court recorded that A.P.P. submitted that the "appellant/informant/victim has not challenged the order dated September 24, 2024 passed by the High Court in the aforesaid Criminal Appeal till today. Thus, when the same judgment and order rendered by the learned Trial Court has not been interfered by this Court and when the said order has attained finality, we are of the view that the present appeal is also required to be dismissed. We have also independently examined the evidence led by the prosecution and we are of the view that the learned Trial Court has not committed any error while passing the impugned judgment and order." Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

 

Justice Ashutosh Kumar all set to be Acting Chief Justice of Patna High Court o be Chief Justice of the Gauhati High Court

The Supreme Court Collegium in its meeting held on 26th May, 2025 has recommended elevation of Justice Ashutosh Kumar, the Acting Chief Justice of Patna High Court o be the Chief Justice of the Gauhati High Court. since January 2025, he has been serving as the Acting Chief Justice of the Patna High Court.

Justice Kumar did his schooling at St. Michael's High School in Patna. He graduated from St. Stephen's College, Delhi University. He earned his LL.B. degree from the Campus Law Centre at Delhi University. He enrolled as an advocate at the Patna High Court on July 9, 1991.

He was appointed as an additional judge of the Patna High Court on May 15, 2014. He was later transferred to the Delhi High Court, where he took the oath of office on January 7, 2015. 

He was confirmed as a permanent judge of the Patna High Court on April 21, 2016, and was transferred back on November 21, 2017.

Acting Chief Justice led bench sets aside judgement of Justice Mohit Kumar Shah but does not order return of arms and license

In Md. Kaisar Warsi vs. The State of Bihar Through the Home Secretary & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy delivered a 8-page long judgement dated May 12, 2025 setting aside the 13-page long judgement dated September 5, 2023 by Justice Mohit Kumar Shah of the High Court which had upheld orders of District Magistrate, Saharsa and Commissioner, Saharsa regarding cancellation of license under Section 17 of the Arms Act. 

The appellant/writ petitioner was a holder of arms license. On March 19, 2021, he was served with a notice by the District Magistrate, Saharsa asking him to explain within 24 hours as to the number of cartridges purchased and spent for a period of 15 years ranging from 2005 to 2020. It appeared from the notice that in the official records, evidence was available of purchase of 1350 cartridges, the last of the purchases having been made on December 25, 2020. The appellant petitioner replied that over a period of 15 years, the cartridges have been spent on special days as also for checking up the fitness of the weapon and he is in possession of 48 cartridges as on that date. Thereafter, the District Magistrate, Saharsa by his order dated August 5, 2021, assumed that the writ petitioner has violated the condition of not indulging in celebratory firing, cancelled the license of the petitioner. This order was sustained by the appellate authority and both the orders were validated by Justice Shah, the Single Judge of the High Court. The reasoning adopted by him in upholding these orders was that even though proscription on celebratory firing was incorporated in the Arms Act only in the year 2019 but then, an additional condition in the Arms Rules, namely, Sub-Clauses -7, 8 and 9 of Arms Rules of 2016, having been violated, the holder of license lost his right for holding such fire-arm and the District Magistrate, Saharsa was perfectly within his rights to cancel his license under Section 17 of the Arms Act.

The High Court's Division Bench observed:"We are not in agreement with the aforenoted logic and reason provided by the learned Single Judge. Section 17 provides the power to the Licensing Authority to vary the conditions subject to which the license has been granted, except such of them as has been prescribed and may for that purpose require the license holder by a notice in writing to deliver up the license to it within such time as may be specified in the notice. A Licensing Authority may, by order in writing suspend a license for any such period which he thinks fit or revoke a license. If the Licensing Authority is satisfied that the holder of the license is prohibited by the Arms Act or by any other law for the time being in force from acquiring, possessing or carrying any arms or ammunition or is of unsound mind or is for any other reason unfit for a license or if it is necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke the license or if the license was obtained by fraud and suppression of material information or if any of the conditions of the license has been contravened. The license could also be revoked or suspended if a license holder fails to comply with the notice under Section 17 requiring him to deliver up the license. It appears that none of these conditions were available for the cancellation of license of the appellant /writ petitioner."

The Bench further observed:"We are also surprised at the contents of the notice given to the appellant asking him to explain within 24 hours, on day to day basis for fifteen years the details of the occasions on which the cartridges purchased by him were spent. We have perused the reply furnished by the appellant, which does not specifically admits of the appellant having spent the cartridges on celebratory firing after 2019. All that the explanation discloses is that 1350 cartridges were acquired over a long period of time from different sources under the license and were spent on special days as also for the purposes of checking the fitness of the weapon so that it is not rendered unfit by disuse. Based on the aforenoted explanation, a police report was called for from the Superintendent of Police, wherein also, no adverse report came against the appellant. Without any further notice to the appellant to deliver up his license and the fire arm and intimating him the reason for proceeding to cancel his license, the license was cancelled only on the ground of having used the weapon for celebratory firing."

Although Justice Shah noted that the proscription of celebratory firing was brought into the statute from the year 2019, he only relied upon three of the clauses, namely, 7, 8 and 9 of Arms Rules of 2016 to justify the order of cancellation of license and its validation by the appellate authority.

Notably, it was recorded in the Justice Shah's judgement that the petitioner had submitted that prior to the amendment of the Arms Act, 1959, which came into effect from December 14, 2019, celebratory firing was not prohibited. It was also submitted that only with effect from that day, Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959 was amended and sub-section (9) was added thereto, which reads as follows:-
“(9) Whoever uses firearm in a rash or negligent manner or in celebratory gunfire so as to endanger human life or personal safety of others shall be punishable with an imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which lakh, or with both.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, “celebratory gunfire” means the practice of using fire-arm in public gatherings, religious places, marriage parties or other functions to fire ammunition.]” 

It was submitted that since celebratory firing was not prohibited prior to December 14, 2019, the petitioner could not have been penalized by cancelling the arms license, hence the order dated August 5, 2021, passed by the District Magistrate, Saharsa, as also the appellate order dated June 3, 2022 was fit to be set aside.

Justice Shah's judgement recorded that the petitioner had submitted his reply dated April 3, 2021, stating therein that he has used 1302 cartridges in between the years 2005 to 2020, for not only testing his rifle but also on the occasion of Eid and Deepawali. His judgement reads: "This Court finds that the amendment in the Arms Act, 1959 has come into force with effect from 14.12.2019, whereby sub-section (9) has been added to Section 25, which prohibits celebrating firing, hence, considering the fact that the petitioner has submitted his reply dated 03.04.2021, admitting therein that he has engaged in celebratory firing on the occasion of Eid and Deepawali in between the years 2005 to 2020, he is definitely liable for penal consequences/cancellation of his arms license, inasmuch as the year 2020 is definitely covered by the aforesaid amendment. Nevertheless, this Court finds that under the old Arms Rules, 1962, certain conditions have been prescribed as pre-requisites for possessing arms license and one of the conditions is that the licensee shall not carry any arms to a fair, religious procession or other public assemblage or within the campus or precincts of any educational institutions, meaning thereby that no arms can be taken to a religious procession or in marriage festivities. In fact, the amended Arms Rules, 2016, which undeniably covers the present case, also postulates various conditions required to be adhered to for possessing an arms license and the same not only prohibits carrying of fire-arms to a fire-arm free zone or in a public place but also prohibits brandishing of fire-arms in public place or firing fire-arms in any public place on the occasion of marriage, public assembly, fair or procession or any public event."

Justice Shah's judgement pointed out that "the petitioner has admitted to celebratory firing on the occasion of Eid and Deepawali festival, apart from having engaged in such firing on the occasion of marriage ceremony as is apparent not only from the reply of the petitioner dated 03.04.2021, but also from the order dt. 03.6.2022, passed by the Commissioner, Koshi Division, Saharsa and from the report of the Police Officer, Sour Bazar Police Station annexed as annexure-4 series to the writ petition, which has been heavily relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, wherein it has been stated that the petitioner has himself informed the said police officer that on the occasion of Eid and other festivals as also on the occasion of marriage ceremonies, he has been engaging in firing in the air." 

Justice Shah's concluded:"this Court finds that the petitioner has not only violated the conditions prescribed for the purposes of possessing an arms license, as postulated under the Arms Rules, 1962 and the Arms Rules, 2016 but has also contravened Section 25 (9) of the Arms Act, 1959, as amended with effect from 14.12.2019, thus the license of the petitioner has rightly been cancelled by the District Magistrate, Saharsa, by the impugned order dt. 05.08.2021. Consequently, the appellate order dated 03.06.2022 also does not suffer either from jurisdictional error or any illegality. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons mentioned, hereinabove, I do not find any merit in the present writ petition, hence the same stands dismissed."

Based on documents on record, Justice Shah's judgement had inferred that the petitioner had admitted that he has been engaging in firing in the air on the occasion of Eid and other festivals as also on the occasion of marriage ceremonies even after 2019. 

The Division Bench pointed out that "In the absence of any adverse report and nothing specific in the explanation of the appellant of having admitted to celebratory firing after 2019, the decisions of the authorities, namely, the District Magistrate and the Commissioner appear to be totally unwarranted and based on complete non-application of mind."

The Division Bench concluded:"For the aforenoted reasons, we set aside the orders passed by the District Magistrate, Saharsa dated 05.08.2021 and the Commissioner dated 03.06.2022 in appeal and the judgment of learned Single Judge upholding the aforenoted two orders. However, we direct the District Magistrate, Saharsa/respondent no. 7 to serve a fresh notice to the appellant, within a period of 30 days from today and seek explanation from him as to why his license be not cancelled for having resorted to celebratory firing from 2019 onwards. After the explanation is received and the police report confirms that there had been violation of anyone of the conditions of license, a reasoned order by the District Magistrate shall be passed within a further period of 90 days, which shall be made known to the appellant forthwith. There would be no necessity of returning the arms and license to the appellant in the meanwhile. The appeal stands allowed to the extent indicated above." The other six respondents were: Divisional Commissioner Koshi Division, Saharsa, Superintendent of Police, Saharsa, Additional District Magistrate, (Arms) Saharsa, District Arms Magistrate, Saharsa,  S.H.O. Sour Bazar Police Station, Saharsa and District Magistrate, Saharsa respectively. The judgement of the Division Bench was authored by Justice Kumar.

 

"no cognizable offence, as alleged, is made out against petitioners", FIRs are quashed/set-aside: Patna High Court

In Broad Son Commodities Private Ltd. through its authorised signatory Santosh Kumar vs The State of Bihar Principal Secretary, Home & Ors. (2025), the petitioner had prayed before the Patna High Court for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari for quashing Bihta P. S. Case of 2021 registered on September 17, 2021 for alleged offences under Sections 379 and 411 of the Indian Penal Code and Rule 39 and 56 of the Bihar Mineral (Concession, Prevention of Illegal Mining, Transportation and Storage) Rules, 2019 on the ground that the same is completely illegal and without any authority of law. It sought an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents No.1 not to take any coercive steps against the petitioner. He prayed for holding that no cognizable offence is made out against the petitioners as per the contents of First Information report and therefore the petitioner cannot be subjected to criminal prosecution. 

The petitioner has sought relief in 15 other cases which were clubbed together and heard together. Justice Arun Kumar Jha bench of the High Court clarified that "core allegations as set out through different FIRs are mostly same, therefore, the pleadings made in Cr.W.J.C. No.501 of 2021 pertaining to Bihta P.S. Case No.864 of 2020 registered in the district of Patna is being referred and considered as to discuss the factual aspects of these cases." There were 16 FIRs and writ petitions on similar allegations. 

The other eight respondents were: Principal Secretary, Home, Government of Bihar, Director General of Police, Bihar, Superintendent of Police, Bhojpur, Officer In Charge, Sahar Police Station, Bhojpur, Principal Secretary, Mines and Geology Department, Bihar, Assistant Director, Mines and Geology Department, Bihar, District Magistrate Cum Collector, Bhojpur and Mines Inspector, District Mining Office, Bhojpur.

The background of the case is that a co-ordinate Bench of the High Court had reserved the judgment on September 28, 2022 but, before the pronouncement of judgment, on November 2, 2022, the Court came across its earlier judgment in the case of M/s Broad Son Commodities Pvt. Ltd. vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. reported in 2018(4) PLJR 706 and judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jayant and Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2021) 2 SCC 670, State of Delhi (NCT) vs. Sanjay reported in (2014) 9 SCC 772 which had a bearing upon the adjudication process and, therefore, the counsel for the parties were given opportunity to address the Court in reference to these judgments. On November 4, 2022, the Single Judge reiterated its earlier view, in view of the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of State of Delhi (NCT) vs. Sanjay and Jayant and Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, that no fault may be found with lodging of the F.I.Rs. in these cases and investigation into these cases need not be interfered with at this stage. The co-ordinate Bench expressed it’s inability to agree with the views expressed by the another co-ordinate Bench of the High Court in the case of Mithilesh Kumar Singh vs. State of Bihar and Anr. (Cr.W.J.C. No. 540 of 2019) and also in Cr.W.J.C. No.1233 of 2021 (Aditya Multicom Private Ltd. Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.) disposed on April 7, 2022. 

In order to make the diverse opinion of the Court consistent with the law and the judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the subject, the co-ordinate Bench of this Court referred these matters to the Division Bench on the following issues:-
(i) Whether Section 22 of the MMDR Act of 1957 read with Rule 56 of the Rules of 2019 may be interpreted so as to read a bar on lodging of the FIR alleging commission of offences of theft etc. under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code against a licensee in the matter of excavation of sand from the river beds from an area beyond or contrary to the mining plan and in violation of the Environment Clearance, on the face of Clause (v) under sub-rule(7) of Rule 56 and the judgments of the Supreme Court in Sanjay's case and Jayant’s case. 

(ii) Whether the alleged thieving sale of sand from the stock license point without issuing pre-paid E-Challan and thereby causing huge revenue loss to the State Exchequer and unlawful gain to the petitioners may be subjected to an investigation by Police by way of a police case registered for the offences under Sections 379, 411, 406 and 420 IPC ?
(iii) Whether the judgments of the learned co-ordinate Benches in the case of Mithilesh Kumar Singh (supra) and M/s Aditya Multicom Pvt. Limited vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (Cr.W.J.C. no. 1233 of 2021) are per incurium for not noticing the earlier judgment of a Bench of equal strength, hence not laying down a correct statement of law?
7. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the Division Bench of the High Court vide order dated February 9, 2024 answered the reference in para-26 in the following manner:-
“26. We accordingly, answer the questions referred to us, as under:
(i) In the matter of excavation of sand from the river beds from an area beyond or contrary to the mining plan and in violation of the Environment Clearance, FIR alleging commission of offences as of theft etc. under the provisions of the IPC can be filed against a licensee and bar under section 22 of the MMDR Act, 1957 read with Rule 56 of the Rules of 2019 would not be attracted.
(ii) For the alleged thieving sale of sand from the stock license point without issuing prepaid E-challan and causing huge revenue loss to the State Exchequer and unlawful gain to the petitioners, FIR can be lodged for the offences punishable under sections 379, 411, 406, 420 I.P.C. and it is open for the Investigating Officer to investigate the same.
(iii) The judgments of the learned Single Judge rendered in the case of Mithilesh Kumar Singh (supra) and M/s Aditya Multicom Pvt. Limited vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (Cr.W.J.C. no. 1233 of 2021) can be said to be per incurium as the earlier decision rendered in the case of Broad Son Commodities Pvt. Ltd. (supra) rendered by another learned Single Judge was not cited and considered.” 

After the Division Bench answered the reference, the matters were specially assigned to the Single Judge Bench of the Court for hearing.

Justice Jha observed: "Now, the only question which is required to be adjudicated whether in given fact and circumstances FIR’s as lodged against petitioners as discussed aforesaid constitute any prima facie case for the offences punishable under Sections 379, 406, 411, 420 of the IPC and for the violation of rules of Bihar Minerals (Concession, Prevention of Illegal Mining, Transportation and Storage Rules,2019) as alleged. 

He noted that by order dated February 20, 2025, the Court impleaded Enforcement Directorate as one of the party-respondent, expressing its view that the interest of Enforcement Directorate (ED) must be protected, in view of submission that the ratio of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 929, is only the guiding legal note available to the Court as far as case of PMLA Act is concerned, and, therefore, the Enforcement Directorate must at least be given an opportunity of hearing by impleading as a party-respondent. It was also submitted that the opportunity of hearing shall not in any way prejudice the petitioners, rather any such denial shall prejudice the Enforcement Directorate, which in broader sense appears essential to unveil the truth of the present crime (schedule offences) which is calyx of corruption and as such against the national socio-economic interest, upon which case of PMLA, 2002 against petitioners are founded.

Justice Jha recorded:"Admittedly, much prior to date of lodging of FIRs i.e. 3 to 4 months, the petitioners were ousted from the possession of sand ghats, which was with them under settlement and after taking possession of those sand ghats, possession of same were given to local SHO and concerned Circle Officers/Mining department to keep sand securely. It appears that if there were no covering of tarpolene as
alleged through FIRs or it was not fenced, it was the responsibility of the local SHO and the authorities with whom the sand in issue was in possession because for all such acts, the petitioners cannot be said to be liable once as possession was withdrawn over sand ghats. In such circumstances, non- displaying rate, name of settlee (petitioners) appears very obvious....Hence, with available allegation, it cannot be said that any prima facie offence qua theft appears to be made out against petitioners." The same holds true for allegations of breach of trust under Section 406, possession of stolen property under Section 411, voluntarily assisting in concealing or disposing or making away sand under Section 414 IPC and cheating under Section 420 of IPC. 

He noted:"The dispute also appears convincing civil in nature because for recovery of non-paid royalty amount for extended period, the concerned authority/respondents filed certificate case as mentioned in aforesaid paragraph No. 38 under the Bihar and Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act, 1914."

In the penultimate paragraph of his 102-page long judgement dated May 16, 2025, Justice Jha observed that the case is squarely covered under the golden guiding principles No. 1, 2, 3, 5 & 7 as available through Bhajan Lal case (supra)". Citing the ratio of the Supreme Court's decision in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal since reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, he concluded: "present FIRs are liable to be quashed/set aside." 

The ratio of Bhajan Lal case (supra) is given in para 102 of the Supreme Court's judgement. It reads: “In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

Drawing on the Supreme Court's decision, the High Court quashed/set-aside all consequential proceedings due to 16 FIRs. 

Notably, 100-page long judgement dated May 16, 2025 has been passed by Justice Jha in M/S. Aditya Multicom Pvt. Ltd. , Through Its Authorized Signatory, Pankaj Singh @ Pankaj Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Through Principal Secretary, Home, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), wherein he dealt with 19 writ petitions drawing on the ratio of Supreme Court's decision in the Bhajan Lal's case. The other eight respondents were: Principal Secretary, Home, Government of Bihar, Director General of Police, Bihar, Superintendent of Police, Aurangabad, Officer In Charge, Barun Police Station, Aurangabad, Principal Secretary, Mines and Geology Department, Bihar, Assistant Director, Mines and Geology Department, Bihar, District Magistrate Cum Collector, Aurangabad and Mines Inspector, District Mining Office, Aurangabad. The text of the judgement by Justice Jha is almost the same as the one given in the case of Broad Son Commodities Private Ltd on the same day.